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Abstract 
This article addresses the connections between corporate collective action and economic 
development in the pre-industrial Low Countries. It focusses on a micro-historic case study: the 
textile industry of the village Nieuwkerke in the county of Flanders. This rural cloth centre 
witnessed an exceptional industrial expansion between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries.. 
Following the recent proposition by Bas van Bavel that market economies follow a fixed pattern of 
development, the chronology of the evolution of Nieuwkerke’s cloth industry can be discussed in 
terms of  three phases. This article argues that the first phase of development (1358-c.1500) was 
characterized by limited success because of pressure from the city of Ypres. The second phase 
(c.1500-c.1550) was marked by an industrial boom, predicated upon successful corporate collective 
action intertwined with the perception of social equality among the village’s cloth entrepreneurs. 
The third and final phase (>c.1550) was one of stagnation and decline, caused by the breaking 
down of the collective and concomitant social polarization. The case study thereby closely conforms 
to van Bavel’s theory about market cycles. Yet, the correlation between economic decline and social 
polarization should in this case be understood in terms of changing perceptions of inequality, rather 
than increasingly unequal opportunities. 
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In the early fourteenth century, several export-oriented rural textile industries emerged in the so-
called ‘West-Quarter’ of the county of Flanders, which covered  the region north-west of the river 
Lys and south of the city Ypres (see Figure 1). Many industrial centres arose here over the course of 
the next two centuries, yet during that period none of them produced more than 2000 pieces per 
annum. Then, around the year 1500, the village of Nieuwkerke suddenly witnessed a swift 
expansion of its cloth trade. By the time of its apogee in the mid-sixteenth-century, Nieuwkerke was 
responsible for no less than 14 % of Flanders’s total woollen cloth output.i In the mere 50 years 
leading up to that point, its industrial expansion had gone hand-in-glove with a demographic boom: 
the population grew from around 1000 in 1469 to some 5000 people around 1550.ii Meanwhile, 
cultural life flourished: two Chambers of Rhetoric were founded in Nieuwkerke, as well as two 
archery confraternities.iii Within only a few years of the start of the sixteenth century, Nieuwkerke’s 
production output had risen to twice its maximum level of the 1400s, and after 1515 it rose to still 
greater heights, peaking at more than 10,000 pieces per year in 1547-49 (see Figure 2). However, 
the village’s ‘golden age’ was short-lived: after 1550, a gradual stagnation set in, and the industry 
vanished almost entirely following the Iconoclastic Fury of 1566 and the subsequent onset of the 
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religious conflict known as the Dutch Revolt (1568-1648).iv This article  addresses the related 
questions of what underlay the exceptional yet ephemeral success of Nieuwkerke’s textile industry, 
and what this means in terms of wider discussions about the influence of institutional frameworks 
on the long-term economic and political development of pre-industrial societies.v 
 More specifically, this article is entrenched in two related frameworks of socio-economic 
history. Firstly, it has an affiliation with the most recent book of Bas van Bavel, wherein the author 
posits that market economies follow a fixed cycle of rise and fall. Put simply, this cycle is 
characterized by limited initial economic growth due to the commodification of land, labour and 
capital, which chiefly benefits a small ‘market elite’ that then seeks to freeze the system responsible 
for its exalted position, causing increasing social polarization and ‘institutional sclerosis’, and 
thence stagnation and decline.vi As we shall see, something similar took place in Nieuwkerke 
between 1350 and 1600, although the underlying mechanisms did not entirely correspond to what 
van Bavel proposes. Another debate aligned with the present analysis attributes a beneficial role to 
institutionalized forms of ‘collective action’. Ever since the seminal historical work devoted to the 
subject by Charles and Louise Tilly in 1981, collective action has been primarily treated in direct 
relation to class struggle.vii Studies of the late medieval Low Countries and beyond also largely 
connect collective action to popular protest, most often in urban society.viii More recently however, 
Tine De Moor has created a Collective Action Network at Utrecht University in the Netherlands in 
order to address the long-term effects of organized forms of collective action on societal 
development. According to De Moor, formalized units of collective action such as guilds were 
paramount to the formation of an ‘institutional infrastructure for socio-political change’, or even 
part of a ‘silent revolution’ that laid the groundwork for the leading economic position of Western 
Europe up until the present day.ix  
 The upcoming analysis will offer a contribution to these debates by integrating van Bavel’s 
focus on cyclical socio-economic development with De Moor’s framework for examining the 
positive influence of collective action. De Moor adopts the term ‘corporate collective action’, which 
she deems ‘the concept best suited to describe the exclusive, self-governed autonomous institutions 
[…] which depended on the idea that a group of people could form a legal body, a universitas.’x 
The goal here is to assess the extent to which the industrial organization of Nieuwkerke fitted within 
the definition of De Moor, and how the specific form of the industrial corporation influenced its 
success. The central thesis is that corporate collective action was the key endogenous variable 
responsible for Nieuwkerke’s industrial expansion in the early- to mid-sixteenth century. 
 The article is divided into three sections corresponding to different phases in the 
development of Nieuwkerke’s cloth industry, both in terms of corporate collective action and of 
economic success. The first phase, roughly from 1300 to 1500, laid the foundation for the village’s 
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cloth corporation, mainly through the acquisition of a legal cloth charter in 1358, and through 
certain key organizational reforms in the second half of the fifteenth century. This paved the way 
for the golden age of Nieuwkerke’s industrial economy (c.1500-c.1550), marked by rising outputs 
coinciding with successfully coordinated corporate collective action of the village’s cloth 
entrepreneurs, the so-called ‘drapers’ (drapiers). By organizing themselves as a collective, the 
drapers were able to protect their industry against exogenous, extra-economic incursions, mainly 
from its urban rival Ypres. Around the same time, the village textile corporation also adopted a 
more collective approach to marketing the finished products through the creation of a public 
commercial platform on the urban markets, which improved the efficiency of trade transactions. 
Saliently, the third phase (>1550), marked by a gradual and then swift industrial decline, coincided 
with a breaking down of the corporate collective. Conflicts within the industry tore apart its inner 
cohesion, at a time when the region witnessed increasing social and religious tensions. These 
culminated in the Iconoclastic Fury of 1566, and the ensuing religious wars were the kiss of death 
for Nieuwkerke’s already enfeebled textile industry. Although these latter occurrences were 
primarily religious in nature, the present study further argues that as social phenomena they cannot 
be disconnected from the discussed developments in the local economy. 
 
Phase one, 1358 - c. 1500: strained beginnings 
Textile production had been the cornerstone of Flanders’s economy since the twelfth century, when 
the industry had become concentrated in the Flemish cities. During this period, the expansion of the 
cloth trade in Flanders went hand in hand with the county’s massive urbanization only rivalled by 
the Italian city-states.xi However, the county’s urban textile centres were confronted with 
fundamental problems towards the end of the thirteenth century, chiefly because of the rise of 
international competition, a reduced supply of the English wool that was invaluable to the 
production process, and the decline of their main commercial outlet of the Champagne fairs.xii To 
cope with these averse circumstances, the cloth entrepreneurs in the Flemish towns reoriented 
towards the production of expensive luxury fabrics from around 1300 onwards.xiii The result was a 
vacuum in the lower market segments of the cloth trade, which was gradually filled by cloth 
producers in the countryside in the vicinity of the cities.xiv Meanwhile, the county’s rural economy 
was receptive to this relocation because increasing demographic pressure in the late thirteenth 
century had caused landholdings to become fragmented, to the point that they became too small to 
provide enough food or income for peasant families. Therefore there was no lack of industrial 
labour in the countryside in this period.xv  
 This, too, was the case in the Flemish West-Quarter. Moreover, when the cloth industry of 
the city of Ypres reoriented towards luxury fabrics in the fourteenth century, the migration of textile 
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workers and entrepreneurs caused a surge of human capital into the neighbouring countryside. 
Indeed, after Ypres’s partial destruction following a major siege in 1383, this process of migration 
visibly bolstered the industries of small (semi-) urban cloth centres such as Langemark and 
Wervik.xvi Nieuwkerke and the other rural settlements of the West-Quarter appear to have profited 
from migratory currents in a similar way, presumably already in the fourteenth century, but 
probably also in a second wave, in the early-fifteenth century. Most likely, there was a correlation 
between the new successes of the rural draperies and the very swift collapse of Langemark’s 
industry around 1400.xvii In addition, the demands of protesting weavers and fullers from Ypres in 
the early-fifteenth century suggest that some of the city’s drapers were engaged in a kind of 
medieval outsourcing, dipping into the cheaper labour pool of the countryside.xviii This appears to 
have been in process as early as the 1280s.xix In doing so, the drapers of Ypres had not only injected 
capital into these villages, but also transferred technical know-how from city to countryside. 
 A pivotal moment in the rise of textile production in the rural West-Quarter occurred in the 
year 1358, when Nieuwkerke first acquired its official charter (keure), giving the village legal 
licence to produce woollen fabrics.xx During this period, the count of Flanders pursued a general 
policy of expanding the privileges of small towns and villages so as to reduce the preeminent power 
of the cities in his territory.xxi However, Nieuwkerke resided under the authority of Louis of Namur, 
member of a cadet-branch of the Flemish comital family that ruled independently over the lordship 
Bailleul—to which Nieuwkerke belonged—between 1305 and 1421.xxii So, Louis of Namur copied 
the strategy of his cousin the count of Flanders by granting Nieuwkerke a legal charter, but in his 
case it was a means to insulate his subjects against incursions from outside his territory. The 
phrasing of the document makes clear that the people of Nieuwkerke requested legal privileges 
from their prince, probably to protect them against harassment from Ypres. Indeed, in 1352, the 
‘bastard of Flanders’, accompanied by 55 citizens, had led an armed expedition to the village to stop 
the manufacture of cloth.xxiii  
 Nieuwkerke was the only village in the region to attain a cloth charter this early on; other 
centres had to wait until the later fifteenth century before they finally received a charter, and some 
of the cloth-producing villages in the West-Quarter never even managed to procure one.xxiv From a 
legal perspective, this was a crucial element in Nieuwkerke’s economic development, because the 
charter formed the legal linchpin of the industry as a ‘corporation’, even though traceable signs of 
corporate collective action only took place much later. The charter also enabled the village industry 
to more or less govern itself and operate with autonomy—important preconditions for 
institutionalized collective action, according to De Moor.xxv  
 Also important was that the charter gave Nieuwkerke’s drapers and artisans an official basis 
to counter infringements from outside, mainly from the city of Ypres. Indeed, the government of 
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Ypres proved a main inhibitor to industrial development in the burgeoning cloth centres of the 
West-Quarter. A political faction in Ypres looking after the interests of the cloth industry was 
constantly trying to smash the competition from industrial villages in the city's hinterland on legal 
grounds.xxvi In 1428, they managed to acquire a charter from Duke Philip the Good of Burgundy, 
then count of Flanders, forbidding the rural textile centres from producing woollens similar to those 
of the city. This hearkened back to privileges granted by Count Louis of Nevers in the early 
fourteenth century, protecting the Flemish cities from competition within a certain radius of their 
walls, but with the exception of towns with a chartered industry.xxvii Accordingly, by (re-) 
establishing this charter, Philip the Good gave Ypres ammunition to ban export-oriented industry in 
the cloth villages through punitive measures. In fact, prosecutions of several rural drapers in the 
West-Quarter followed. Moreover, in June 1429, the Count ordered his officers to arrest cloth 
entrepreneurs from Nieuwkerke on their way to the fair of the Flemish town Torhout.xxviii 
 Thus began a legal battle during which the West-Quarter villages, Nieuwkerke chief among 
them, tried to have this prohibitive charter nullified. The villages were supported in their attempts 
by Jeanne de Harcourt, dowager countess of Namur and lady of Bailleul. With her help, their 
emissaries sought to bypass the decision of the count of Flanders through an appeal to the 
Parlement of Paris.xxix The Parlement initially lifted the ban on rural cloth production, but Philip the 
Good simply overturned its decision, and in 1431 the Duke reaffirmed his previous ruling 
obstructing Nieuwkerke’s industry.xxx The village’s champion Jeanne de Harcourt was in a difficult 
position because Duke Philip was her feudal overlord, having bought the county of Namur in 
1421.xxxi Fortunately for the drapers of Nieuwkerke, after 1435 Philip withdrew from interfering in 
French matters and by extension in the Parlement, so that in 1441, the procurator of the reinstated 
king of France brought the issue before that court. Finally, in 1449, the Parlement determined that 
the rights of the village industries were to be respected.xxxii Thereafter followed a few decades when 
the rural centres were apparently left alone by the urban aggressor, and Philip the Good’s son and 
successor Charles the Bold did not reinstate Ypres’s privilege during his reign (1467-77) either. It 
was during this period that Nieuwkerke first reached a production output above 2000 pieces per 
annum.xxxiii 
 However, the 1480s and 1490s were again marked by crisis because of the renewed political 
power of Ypres and the continuous state of war in the West-Quarter. First the region was invaded 
by the king of France and then, later, it became the stage of civil war within Flanders, when the 
Flemish cities rose up against Archduke Maximilian I.xxxiv As a consequence of this urban uprising, 
Ypres briefly ruled supremely in the West-Quarter in the early 1480s. The city used its new 
authority to come down hard on the rural draperies in its hinterland again, prosecuting many cloth 
entrepreneurs from the various villages.xxxv The hardships to Nieuwkerke’s cloth industry in the 
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1480s are reflected in its irregular production outputs during this period. These dropped from 1757 
pieces in 1480 to 517 in 1481, followed by a few years when the cloth tax was not collected at all 
because of Ypres’s hegemony, only to come in at an all time low of 258 pieces in 1489.xxxvi Then in 
1501, Philip the Fair, count of Flanders, reinstated Ypres’s charter, once again restricting textile 
production in the West-Quarter along the lines laid down in the city’s privilege of 1428.xxxvii When 
a number of cloth traders from Nieuwkerke and some other villages continued to sell their 
prohibited fabrics in Antwerp and Bergen op Zoom, the governments of these cities were forced to 
publish placards that banned merchants from having any commercial dealings with these 
places.xxxviii  Joost Godeschalck, a weaver who had lived in Nieuwkerke in this period, would later 
remark that at that time ‘the trade broke down entirely’.xxxix 
 All in all, the first phase of formally organized industry in Nieuwkerke was marked by strain 
due to the opposition from Ypres. And although the city was not wholly successful in defeating the 
rural competition, there is little doubt that its efforts had a negative effect on the potential growth of 
the industries. The villages were unable to overcome this obstacle, firstly because they were 
dependent upon the support of lords and princes. Yet even though Countess Jeanne de Harcourt 
defended the interests of the cloth villages she held in usufruct, her efforts were wasted because her 
opponent Philip the Good was also her feudal superior. Nor did the efforts of the lords of 
Nieuwkerke contribute much in this period. In 1484, the lord brooked some temporary success 
through procuring decrees of the Parlement of Paris, but these were overturned one year later by the 
administration of the new count of Flanders.xl The counts were mainly on Ypres’s side throughout 
the fifteenth century, having had close ties with the city’s oligarchy ever since the late fourteenth 
century.xli Yet make no mistake: for Ypres, princely support also required careful lobbying, as 
evidenced by the £8875 par. that exchanged hands to buy the city its important privilege of 1428.xlii 
 Secondly, the lack of internal cohesion within the textile ‘corporation’ of Nieuwkerke 
arguably restricted its potential to defend itself. In the legal proceedings via the Parlement and 
French monarchy in 1443, there is mention of only ‘a small number of inhabitants of the parishes 
[Nieuwkerke, Nieppe, and Eécke]’ who initiated the legal objections (my emphasis).xliii Ypres’s 
solicitor used this as a legal argument to try and refute the villages’ case before the Parlement: he 
claimed the 77 people who filed the suit had no right to declare themselves representatives of a 
community of some 6000 people in total.xliv Obviously, this point should not be taken too far, since 
one could hardly expect the village communities in their entirety to lend nominal support to the 
lawsuit. On the other hand, additional evidence does indeed indicate that the drapers may have 
lacked the required unity to engage in ‘corporate collective action’. In the 1450s, there were clear 
signs of factional struggle within the cloth industry of Nieuwkerke. A small group of wealthy 
drapers were apparently acting against the interests of the ‘commun pueple’ by combining several 
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craft stages in their workshops and hiring workers from outside the community.xlv Because 
Nieuwkerke’s industry hardly had any regulations at this point, it may have fallen victim to 
exploitation by a small group of dominant drapers to whom the village formed an entrepreneurial 
paradise. Presumably, the differences in entrepreneurial scale created sentiments of unequal 
opportunity among one faction of drapers, which undermined social cohesion within the 
corporation. 
 On the one hand therefore, the lack of unity within Nieuwkerke’s drapery may have factored 
into its failure to reach common accord in the fight against Ypres. On the other hand, in the 1450s 
and 1460s, the conflict between factions of entrepreneurs over unequal opportunities also led to an 
increase in formal regulations. The administration of Charles the Bold, who was lord of Bailleul at 
the time, laid the institutional groundwork for more ‘egalitarian’ conditions for entrepreneurs, 
mainly by countering vertical integration and electing an officer to guard over regulations that were 
expanded considerably in 1462.xlvi After Charles the Bold’s demise in 1477, the political turmoil 
shifted conditions to the detriment of the West-Quarter cloth villages, but Nieuwkerke’s redacted 
cloth charter would be the first building block for its ‘golden age’ in the first half of the sixteenth 
century. 
 
Phase two, c. 1500 - c. 1550: corporate collective action and ‘golden age’ 
The early sixteenth century marked the beginning of a new phase in the economic development of 
Nieuwkerke. Saliently, the village’s reversal of fortune began when a new lord arrived on the scene 
in 1503. In a legal document of 1545, the drapers of Ypres complained that the village lord’s 
protection had prevented their reinstated cloth charter of 1501 from sticking in Nieuwkerke:  
 
 [U]nder cover of being subjects of the late count of Gavere, and before that of his father the 
 late lord of Fiennes, who were both successively grand governors in our land and county of 
 Flanders and feared accordingly, […] [the people of Nieuwkerke] have intervened and acted 
 to contravene against the mentioned decree and bylaw.xlvii 
 
Indeed, the new lord looked after the interests of his villagers on several occasions, interfering on 
their behalf against Ypres.xlviii He himself had a vested interest in the survival and success of the 
rural drapery, because he was entitled to 6d par. for each cloth that was produced within the 
parish.xlix Every piece of cloth that was to be sold as ‘chartered’ cloth from Nieuwkerke had to be 
inspected by industrial officials, the ‘wardens’ (wardeinen), and if the quality was sufficient, the 
fabric received a leaden seal which signified that it had passed inspection. The drapers had to pay a 
12d duty for this privilege, half of which went to the count of Flanders, and the other half to the lord 
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of Nieuwkerke. Accordingly, the wardens had to keep a record of how many cloths they sealed, and 
these documents provide us with relatively exact production figures for parts of the sixteenth 
century (Figure 2). 
 Certainly, the same interests had already existed in the fifteenth century, but at that time the 
lords of Nieuwkerke had been local nobles without much political clout.l Up until the late 
fourteenth century, the lordship was held by the toponymic van Nieuwkerke family, who were only 
engaged with their single lordship, and in the fifteenth century the lords of the village belonged to 
the relatively unimpressive de la Douve family.li After his marriage with heiress Isabel de la Douve, 
lord George d’Escornay briefly ruled over it, but his highest political office was that of alderman in 
the Franc of Bruges.lii Now, in 1503, lordship reverted to Jacques II de Luxembourg-Fiennes, 
knight of the Order of the Golden Fleece, one of the most eminent aristocrats of the Low Countries, 
and stadholder of Flanders and Artois from 1504 onwards. Indeed, according to Hans Cools, from 
around 1490, he was one of the nobles who ‘determined the appearance of the Burgundian-
Habsburg court for several decades.’liii As stadholder of Flanders, his authority was perhaps not 
‘feared’ as such by the people of Ypres, but his high position at court must have been well known in 
the city. At various times, Jacques de Luxembourg interfered in issues between Ypres’s city 
government and other parties, and the same went for his successor.liv  
 However, it is important to stress that it was the drapers of Nieuwkerke who exploited the 
fearsome quality of their lord. According to Frans de Lopere, who had lived in the village at the 
time, the drapers initially obeyed the bylaws of Ypres’s prohibitive privilege of 1501 ‘until they 
bought the lordship of Nieuwkerke and bequeathed it to the lord of Fiennes’ (my emphases), 
whereafter they began to produce cloth in violation of the privilege.lv Unfortunately, the original 
document of infeudation is not extant, so it is unclear what to make exactly of this curious 
statement. An entry in the inventory of the archives of the lords of Egmont—who inherited 
Nieuwkerke after 1550—mentions the ‘purchase by the lord of Fiennes of the land and seigniory of 
Nieuwkerke’ without mentioning the involvement of the villagers.lvi But another source sheds more 
light on the event. It derives from a now lost document of 14 July 1503. Isidore Diegerick, 
nineteenth-century archivist of the city archives of Ypres, summarized the document as follows in 
1868: 
 
 [T]he aldermen and inhabitants of the lordship Nieuwkerke have committed themselves, in 
 the name of the community, to pay Jacques de Luxembourg […], their lord, the sum of  
 £12,000 par., to be employed for the redemption of a claim laid on the aforementioned  
 lordship by Jean Sauvage.lvii 
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The Egmont archives indeed mention an annual rent of £95 15s ‘for the benefit of Lord Jean 
Sauvage’, but it is unclear how this claim had come to rest upon the lordship.lviii It probably ensued 
from a loan made out by Sauvage to one of the village’s former lords or even Jacques de 
Luxembourg himself; a lump sum in exchange for a yearly annuity. Jean le Sauvage was a key 
figure at the Burgundian-Habsburg court, a Knight of the Golden Fleece, Lord of Escobecques near 
Lille, and president of the Council of Flanders since 1497.lix This placed him very close to Jacques 
de Luxembourg. In fact, in 1508, the two men joined a party of nobles who stood surety for a sum 
of 50,000 crowns that the future Charles V had to pay if he should renege on his marriage contract 
with Mary Tudor.lx Therefore it seems probable that le Sauvage had lent a large sum to the lord of 
Nieuwkerke at some point, whether this was de Luxembourg or not.  
 In any case, the joint effort by the people of Nieuwkerke to either purchase the lordship or to 
buy off such a massive debt resting on it would have been an impressive form of collective action 
on the part of the village community in general. The £12,000 par. truly was an extraordinarily high 
sum by any standard; one hundred times higher than the annual income the lord could expect from 
his 6d duty on sealed cloth! Unfortunately, there are no references as to how and if this money was 
ever raised. Yet, Jacques de Luxembourg certainly became lord of Nieuwkerke in 1503, and 
apparently the village’s cloth industry benefited from his protection. The reason why the drapers 
needed a powerful aristocrat as their lord was his ability, not so much to scare off Ypres, as to lobby 
on their behalf with the city and with the count of Flanders. Indeed, the original document 
specifying that the people of Nieuwkerke would pay the £12000 was joined to two letters addressed 
by Jacques de Luxembourg to the magistrate of Ypres, inviting them to discuss the long-standing 
disagreement between the city and the cloth village.lxi 
 Still, a powerful lord was mainly useful as an external shield. Internally, the less involved he 
was, the better it suited the cloth entrepreneurs of Nieuwkerke. Fortunately for them, although the 
lords officially ruled over the industry, in practice, their engagement was superficial at best. This is 
noteworthy, because these same lords did actively interfere in their other cloth industry of the town 
Armentières.lxii Therefore, Nieuwkerke’s industry continued to enjoy a large degree of autonomy  
and self-governance. Yet the conflicts over unfair competition in the 1450s make clear that up to 
that point, the industry lacked the proper ‘institutionalization’. In other words: it had still been 
largely deregulated, whereas the successful implementation of corporate collective action required a 
set of rules that prevented free-riding, and guarded over collective interests in general.lxiii This is 
where the expanded regulations begun during the reign of Charles the Bold came in. For one thing, 
the 1462 charter introduced the office of ‘bailiff of the drapery’ to uphold the regulations and 
supervise the wardens. Very important in this regard was a new bylaw ruling that all fabrics 
henceforth required the ‘draper’s mark’ (’t maerc van den drapier) to be woven into them.lxiv This 
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measure was presumably designed to increase accountability, as the cloth charter articulated that 
customers could return substandard cloth to sender via the wardens, who were able to identify the 
responsible party by his or her mark. However, this also meant that the industrial officers had to 
have held some kind of administration listing which mark belonged to which draper. Accordingly, 
new drapers had to be entered into this ledger while former entrepreneurs had to be removed from 
it, which strongly suggests that entrance into the drapery came with a procedure of admission, even 
though the charters never explicitly mention this. 
 The draper’s mark therefore constituted a two-pronged approach, since it not only raised 
accountability but acted as a gatekeeper as well by monitoring new entrants. As mentioned, De 
Moor considers exclusivity a key component of corporate collective action, and in that sense the 
formal use of the draper’s marks in Nieuwkerke contributed towards the development of corporate 
collective action. Having said that, there is not really any evidence that tells of the criteria of 
admission, with the exception of a bylaw specifying that all drapers had to reside in Nieuwkerke 
and be taxable (taillable) there.lxv Nevertheless, the mark was a sign of membership of the 
corporation, and both this and the implied initiation rite would have increased cohesion among the 
drapers. That sense of unity was further facilitated by the periodic public inquests (waerheden) also 
instituted in 1462, at which the industrial officers passed judgment on offenders of the regulations. 
All drapers and master-artisans could be summoned to attend these proceedings. The inquests 
hearkened back to an old inclusive legal tradition in Flanders, the so-called franches vérités or 
waerheden, which were general inquests held by an officer of the Count, who invited ordinary 
people to bear testimony in local judicial matters.lxvi Indeed, during the waerheden of Nieuwkerke’s 
drapery, any attendant could be prompted to give testimony concerning the contents of the bylaws, 
and therefore all those present had to swear an oath.lxvii This ensured that people were more 
involved with their fellows, and reinforced general knowledge about the regulations while at the 
same time ratifying the verdicts of the wardens. Meanwhile, evidence about the cloth industry in the 
small Flemish town Estaires (Stegers) indicates that the waerheden were also the occasion when the 
wardens officially recorded the names of new drapers.lxviii So towards the sixteenth century, the 
institutional framework was already stimulating a sense of membership and collective 
responsibility, although the turbulent period of the 1470s until around 1500 had precluded these 
facets from bearing fruit. 
 Starting in 1503, then, Nieuwkerke drew up its lordly ‘cover’, while the drapery effectively 
maintained its independence and strengthened internal control over its members. It was around the 
same time that the village entrepreneurs started a new collective approach towards marketing their 
cloth. From the late fifteenth- to the mid-sixteenth century, the main commercial outlet for 
Nieuwkerke’s fabrics were the Brabantine cities Bergen op Zoom and Antwerp.lxix No later than 
  12 
1511, the village’s entrepreneurs decided to rent a cloth hall—functioning both as a shop and as 
storage facility—during the fairs of Bergen op Zoom, for the benefit of ‘the entire nation of the 
drapery of Nieuwkerke’.lxx This suggests that some type of common fund had been created before 
that moment in order to come up with the yearly rent of £120 par.lxxi Around the same time, the 
corporation rented a cloth hall in Antwerp. By 1573, its rental price amounted to no less than £720 
par. per year.lxxii There is little doubt but the management of these rent sums would have required a 
commonly controlled treasury. Also, the phrasing in the original contract with the city government 
of Bergen op Zoom conjures up an image of an actual trading ‘nation’, which supports the idea that 
Nieuwkerke’s drapers were perceived by outsiders as a corporation. If Nieuwkerke’s drapers termed 
themselves a trading nation, this would stimulate their sense of community, and it would further 
suggest that there was a common fund.lxxiii Moreover, looking at the production figures of the 
village’s industry, it is very clear that cloth output skyrocketed from around this moment (Figure 2).  
 The commercial policy of Nieuwkerke’s textile corporation was not ‘original’ as such, since 
foreign traders had already used cloth halls in the fourteenth century.lxxiv The village’s entrepreneurs 
simply copied a strategy that was already deployed by others, and the reason they did so was 
because it worked. When the drapers from Nieuwkerke frequented the fairs at Bergen op Zoom, 
they could plainly see how places like Diest, Weert, and Turnhout also rented common warehouses 
and stores.lxxv Because of the continuous exchange between traders, successful commercial methods 
of foreign colleagues were imitated to and fro.lxxvi In fact, sometimes it was possible to swoop into a 
recently vacated lodging that had already been used as a cloth hall. The drapers of the successful 
Flemish cloth town Armentières even employed this tactic on two occasions. In 1529, they took 
over the ‘old hall of Weert’ in Bergen op Zoom.lxxvii A few years later, they also took up lodging in 
Antwerp, this time in the house ‘formerly known as the hall of Nieuwkerke’.lxxviii   
 The main benefit of the shared trading post for the village’s entrepreneurial corporation was 
to lower transaction costs per trader. But while this seems very much in service of the common 
welfare, essentially it would not have been very advantageous to rich entrepreneurs who had their 
own means to set up private stores. Most likely therefore, one reason why the collective initiative 
took hold was because it coincided with a general period of slump, thereby drawing all 
entrepreneurs into the collective. After all, the richest drapers were presumably most apt to 
influence industrial policy, so they had to have seen the need—or the opportunity—to lower their 
expenses by installing a public venture. But it stands to reason that they were the ones who had to 
front a larger proportion of the rent sum, and like everybody else had to contend not only with an 
increased degree of control by the industrial officers, but also with additional levies per piece of 
cloth that was processed via the hall.lxxix In other words: the need had to have been dire for them to 
accept such an arrangement. Indeed, textile industries elsewhere instated similar collective efforts at 
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times when their fortunes were on the wane. So for instance, the city magistrate of Leiden in the 
county of Holland organized a common ‘purse’ (beurs)—a joint venture that sold cloth in large 
quantities—in 1530, in order to maintain a firmer control on the price level of the town’s fabrics.lxxx 
In fifteenth-century Bergues-Saint-Winoc in Flanders, a similar common fund (burse) was set up to 
support the newly founded branch of light textiles.lxxxi In both cases, the collective enterprise was 
aimed at countering a situation of crisis. Nieuwkerke’s inspiration may have likewise derived from 
its losses in the last decades of the fifteenth century, causing even the wealthier entrepreneurs to see 
the added benefit of corporate cooperation.  
 There is also a possibility that while corporate policy posed as beneficial to all, it really 
served the needs of a small elite in particular. Even though the cloth halls were technically open to 
‘all those of the [parish Nieuwkerke] carrying or transporting cloth into said cities’,lxxxii in practice, 
the enterprise could have benefited the wealthier drapers in particular. In order to make use of the 
cloth halls, one had to cross the vast distance of about 175 km between the Flemish West-Quarter 
and the north of Brabant. Although the expenditures of such a journey were of little effect, the 
undertaking did require a considerable investment of time during which the draper was absent from 
his or her workshop.lxxxiii This potentially put drapers with smaller operations at a disadvantage. 
Then again, the example of the beurs of Leiden would belie this notion, because in that case the 
cooperative venture was actually intended to support poorer drapers who could not travel to the 
market towns.lxxxiv To that effect, in Leiden’s drapery the cloths were sold on a common account, 
which those of Nieuwkerke may also have been. Indeed, it seems probable that Nieuwkerke’s 
textile corporation followed a procedure akin to that of the cloth centre Armentières, where the 
wardens appointed official hall masters to sell the fabrics of everybody who could not travel to the 
market cities, in exchange for a small fee.lxxxv After all, the drapers of Armentières occupied 
premises that had been previously used by those of Nieuwkerke, so it is not unlikely that the latter 
had used them in a similar fashion. Moreover, a proportion of Nieuwkerke’s cloth was dyed in 
Armentières, which further stimulated the exchange of industrial and commercial methods.lxxxvi 
 The corporate collective action in Nieuwkerke’s cloth industry also extended into local 
politics. For one thing, the village aldermen must have been involved in the attempts to buy off the 
claim held on the lordship by Jean le Sauvage in 1503—although that was not a measure 
exclusively affecting the cloth industry. Yet they also directly interfered to guard over industrial 
interests. In 1522 for instance, the aldermen pressured the magistrate of Ypres to make restitutions 
for a shipment of raw materials that had never been delivered to the drapers of Nieuwkerke.lxxxvii  
These raw materials were apparently purchased collectively—which is further proof of the 
existence of a corporation—and the village officials were involved in protecting the transaction. 
This is not altogether surprising, considering that the aldermen often engaged in cloth enterprises 
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themselves, or were related to drapers.lxxxviii Furthermore, the drapers of Nieuwkerke were also 
well-versed in the game of political lobbying, as apparent from their collaboration with the cloth 
towns Poperinge and Mesen in 1545. At that time, Ypres was once again launching a legal assault 
on the draperies in its hinterland, and in an attempt to bribe their way to a favourable verdict, the 
entrepreneurs of Nieuwkerke and the two towns pooled their money to buy the governor of Flanders 
a new horse.lxxxix Incidentally, this again implies some kind of shared fund of the village’s 
entrepreneurs, to be deployed in such cases. 
 In sum: from around 1500 to 1550, the close interconnections of local politics with industry 
and trade benefited corporate collective action among the drapers of Nieuwkerke. The foundations 
for this collective action were laid in the second half of the fifteenth century, as the village drapers 
united against the external threat of Ypres, whilst battling the attempts at vertical integration of a 
small number of entrepreneurs within their own village. Perhaps it is no coincidence that this 
prologue to effective collective action was paralleled in increased references to the ‘Common 
Good’ during the same period. In the Low Countries in general and the county of Flanders in 
particular, this concept mainly developed within the towns as an expression of urban self-
governance, as well as one of collaboration within the urban network.xc This ideological 
underpinning of collective action was clearly visible in 1484, when the draping ‘community’ (’t 
ghemeente), consisting of 160 people, conferred for three hours in Nieuwkerke’s parish church to 
reach an accord about the terms presented to them by Ypres.xci References to acts for the ‘benefit of 
the community of drapers’ (proufict du commun des drapiers) and the ‘entire nation’ on the 
commercial level were a rhetorical reiteration of this collective action.xcii There is little doubt that 
this rhetoric promoted internal cohesion, which was reflected in the most pronounced expansion of 
industrial productivity that Nieuwkerke ever reached. Also, the collective strategy of the rural cloth 
centre was mirrored by the major cloth centre Armentières, which rose to prominence in unison 
with Nieuwkerke. When the drapers of that town rented their cloth hall in Antwerp in 1534, no less 
than 93 of them adjoined their names to the contract.xciii In connection with the economic cycle 
identified by van Bavel, this period in the development of Nieuwkerke’s textile economy was 
marked by a relatively ‘closed’ system, in the sense that exchange was monitored by the collective 
through the interference of industrial officers. The accompanying social stability within the ranks of 
the cloth entrepreneurs was conducive to industrial flourishing.xciv However, it was the deep breath 
before the plunge, and the gradual breaking down of internal cohesion would be accompanied by 
the industry’s overall decline. 
 
Phase three, after c. 1550: bang or whimper? 
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In 1593, the Flemish Chamber of Accounts in Lille held an inquest to determine the current state of 
the textile industries in Western Flanders. Although many old cloth centres had faltered in recent 
years, in most places there were signs of recovery and renewed growth.xcv However, Nieuwkerke 
was found to be a mere shadow of its former self.xcvi It is tempting to lay this at the door of the 
Dutch Revolt, the religious war that had taken hold of the region after 1566. Emperor Philip II’s 
confiscation of Nieuwkerke’s premises in Antwerp already dealt a blow to the commercial potential 
of the village industry in 1573, and a decade later the Brabantine city was conquered completely by 
imperial Spanish troops.xcvii Moreover, in 1582, Spanish soldiers destroyed a large part of 
Nieuwkerke, including the village’s cloth hall. These events caused a mass emigration from the 
Flemish West-Quarter, ensuring that the region’s industrial successes ended for good.xcviii Then 
again, similar circumstances hit other villages and towns, and those were able to recover.xcix 
Armentières for instance, whose industrial boom had run parallel to that of Nieuwkerke, saw a 
renewed upturn during the last decades of the sixteenth century.c Therefore this cannot have been 
the whole story. 
  Indeed, in the course of the 1550s, the output of Nieuwkerke’s fabrics had already begun to 
drop gradually, never again to reach the level of the 1540s (Figure 2).ci Saliently, this downturn 
coincided with increased polarization and factional struggles within the corporation of drapers. A 
series of conflicts ensued in the 1550s between a group of rich entrepreneurs on one side and the 
poor and ‘common’ (commun) drapers on the other. Members of the latter faction wanted to curb 
scale-enlargement of their richer colleagues, because they were increasingly less able to compete 
with them. Their discontent echoed that of their predecessors in the 1450s, with references to the 
Common Good by the faction that felt they lacked equal opportunities.cii Around this same time, the 
wardens acted on complaints from within the drapery that certain traders were bypassing the joint 
cloth halls in Antwerp and Bergen op Zoom, renting private premises to market their products 
instead.ciii In terms of corporate collective action, this constituted a form of free-riding, since the 
wardens could not monitor sales outside the halls. These traders were theoretically able to fly the 
colours of Nieuwkerke’s chartered drapery while selling substandard fabrics, which did not only 
give them a competitive advantage, but was also damaging to the industry’s general reputation. 
Since renting private stores must have been a costly affair, the drapers in question were at the 
wealthier end of the spectrum. Therefore it appears that in the course of Nieuwkerke’s blooming, a 
group of entrepreneurs had pulled away from their fellows in terms of prosperity, and now sought to 
undermine the collective in their own interest. This corresponds closely to what Oliver Volckart 
concluded about village cooperation in the marketing of agricultural produce in the later Middle 
Ages: these collectives only lasted while there was a relatively small group of rich participants. 
Internal stratification within the community was not a problem, as long as the affluent did not 
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become too numerous, in which case they stood to gain more from stepping outside of—and 
thereby breaking— the collective.civ 
 These developments also conform to van Bavel’s prediction about the connection between 
rising social polarization and economic decline. Yet it would be wrong to label the Nieuwkerke case 
a unilateral question of ‘the rich’ parasitizing the industry. In the second half of the sixteenth 
century, Nieuwkerke’s cloth industry was facing massive exogenous challenges, both in terms of 
international competition and a shift in market demand; circumstances which were worsened by an 
overall increase in food prices and a downturn in real wages.cv In dealing with these external 
developments, the industrial officers were wedged in between opposing factions on the home front. 
While they were trying to rein in the rich drapers who had set up private shop in Antwerp, at the 
other end they had to contend with inferior cloth from poor or impoverished producers. This is 
apparent from their attempts, around the year 1553, to enforce stricter regulations on the types of 
wool allowed for use.cvi Although a useful strategy in an increasingly competitive international 
textile market, this constituted an indirect assault upon the poorer drapers, who were unable to 
afford materials of the required standards. Subpar fabrics would indeed have damaged the 
reputation of Nieuwkerke’s product, thereby undermining collective interests just as much as 
trading outside the halls did. However that may be, these new regulations must have fuelled the 
flame of factional friction even more. Although the high fines were brought down through the 
interference of the Flemish Chamber of Accounts, the requirements remained in place. As a 
consequence, many drapers will have been unable to maintain their own enterprises, and were 
forced to work for their richer colleagues, either as subcontractors or as wage workers.cvii Indeed, 
the available data from the wardens’ accounts of the cloth seal in 1564-65 suggests that by that time 
more than half of the village’s drapers had an annual output that was probably too small to 
constitute a successful enterprise on its own merit (see Table 1). Even in the cloth industry of 
Leiden, where the woollens were more expensive than in Nieuwkerke, an individual production of 
30 pieces per annum signified only a small operation.cviii As the figures for Nieuwkerke show, more 
than half of the village’s cloth entrepreneurs produced fewer than 25 cloths annually, and therefore 
it seems unlikely that their industrial revenue alone was sufficient to support their families.  
 Still, it remains unclear to what extent the cracks in the collective were a cause, rather than a 
consequence, of the recession. After all, Nieuwkerke was not the only textile centre that faced 
conflicts about inequality between drapers in this period. In the Flemish boom-town Hondschoote 
in 1557, the ‘commun drapiers’ were also protesting against attempts at scale-enlargement by the 
richer entrepreneurs.cix The difference was that Hondschoote was almost entirely driven by capital 
inputs from external merchant firms, in the fifteenth century mainly from Bruges, in the sixteenth 
from Antwerp.cx These merchants bought finished cloth off the drapers and took care of the 
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marketing process. By contrast, in Nieuwkerke it was the drapers who oversaw both the production 
process and the marketing of fabrics.cxi While things were going smoothly, this integration on the 
collective level may have given the drapers a self-image of belonging to unified corporation. Yet, 
when their own tradesmen started openly pursuing individual gain, apparently enriching themselves 
at the expense of the others, this was interpreted as a subversion of the public interest, causing 
‘great scandal and damage to the entire parish’.cxii 
 Following van Bavel’s framework then, one might argue that the 1550s marked the end to 
the cycle of development of Nieuwkerke’s textile industry, with growing inequality between the 
richer drapers—the ‘market elite’—and the rest of the corporation. However, it is very much the 
question whether the conflicts within the industry were sparked by actual increasing inequality, as 
van Bavel’s theory would suggest. The all-round worsening of Nieuwkerke’s position on the 
international cloth market might have been unequally distributed over the various layers of society, 
but it is more likely that the crucial element was an absolute reduction of prosperity for the 
entrepreneurs in general. Of course, a drop in income brought the poorer drapers a lot closer to the 
bottom than the rich, thereby raising the former’s perception of unequal opportunities, which 
became the proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back. This is in accordance with a recent study 
that found no clear correlation between rising sentiments of unequal opportunity—potentially 
leading to revolt—on the one hand, and objectively measurable increases in societal inequality on 
the other hand.cxiii There is even evidence to suggest that economic decline diminished a pre-
industrial society’s potential for inequality, because the surplus that could be extracted by an elite 
was lower under these circumstances.cxiv Indeed, in the first quarter of the sixteenth century, the 
Brabantine city of ‘s-Hertogenbosch (Bois-le-Duc) witnessed increasing socio-political 
polarization, just like Nieuwkerke, yet during this period the distribution of wealth actually became 
more egalitarian. In that instance as well, it was the economic ‘cake’ in general that shrank, 
bringing the less well-to-do closer to, or across, the brink of poverty.cxv 
 Having said that, one cannot exclude the possibility that the polarization arose at least in part 
because of actual rising inequality. Indeed, another complaint levelled against the richer drapers of 
Nieuwkerke was that they traded in ‘foreign cloth’ (draps estrangiers), which is to say any textiles 
that were not produced in the local parish.cxvi This may suggest that these cloth entrepreneurs had in 
fact made the jump to more independent merchant activity in an attempt at hedging their bets 
following deteriorating market conditions for Nieuwkerke’s fabrics. From the perspective of the 
corporate collective, this was base treason, because in doing so, these traders diverted capital from 
potentially productive usage in the village itself.cxvii These merchant-drapers may have had one foot 
out the door already, as they obviously had their own personal ties to the market cities. On the other 
hand, no such accumulation of wealth in the village’s social top layer was apparent at the moment 
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when the religious wars broke out. In the period 1566-72 even the wealthiest inhabitants of 
Nieuwkerke—among whom were some drapers—did not qualify as truly rich in their time, the 
richest draper possessing less than £400 Flemish groats.cxviii Such entrepreneurs were less able to 
recover from temporary economic adversity than the far more prosperous merchants, for example 
those from the Antwerp trading firms.cxix They were also more dependent upon pooling their 
resources, both to buy the expensive raw materials and to come up with the rent for their 
commercial outlets in the market cities. Even though Nieuwkerke’s corporation still rented the cloth 
hall in Antwerp shortly before it was seized in 1573, through falling production figures the ratio 
between overhead and income would have been increasingly off keel. 
 So, on the one hand, the all out state of war after the Iconoclastic Fury of 1566 seems like a 
deus ex machina that extinguished Nieuwkerke’s cloth industry with a bang. The wave of 
emigration from the general region, coupled with the fall of Antwerp in 1585, was certainly 
instrumental in the downfall of Nieuwkerke’s cloth industry.cxx On the other hand, the question 
remains whether without these external circumstances the village would have recovered from the 
decline that had already set in by that time. In fact, the religious troubles of this period can arguably 
be considered as interconnected with the underlying social tensions.cxxi The increased gap between 
poor and rich—whether imagined or real—within the cloth industry of Nieuwkerke was only 
indicative of a social rift that was impacting upon society as a whole. The Iconoclastic Fury itself 
has sometimes been attributed to the aftermath of harvest failures that brought social tensions to 
breaking point.cxxii Peter Arnade has also emphasized the role of the ‘grossly unequal distribution of 
wealth’ in the textile industries of the West-Quarter in the rise of militant Calvinism in the 
region.cxxiii Indeed, there were increasing signs of poverty in the West-Quarter during this period. 
One inhabitant of Nieuwkerke was even so plagued by hunger in 1556 that he robbed the parish 
church of its silver chalice, but not before eating the sacramental bread it contained.cxxiv At the other 
end of the spectrum, two men, one of whom was a draper from Nieuwkerke, were convicted for 
abusing their status as deputies to the bailiff in order to extort money from their fellows in several 
rural parishes.cxxv  
 Within this context of worsening social conditions, the drapers were in a position to behave 
very much like the ‘market elites’ characteristic of the end-cycle in van Bavel’s model, potentially 
enriching themselves at the expense of ordinary people whose collective efforts in industry and 
trade had advanced the primacy of the market but who had thereby advanced their own market-
dependence.cxxvi Indeed, at this juncture, Nieuwkerke’s development seems to fit the model quite 
well, because the expansion of its drapery in the sixteenth century was buttressed by cloth workers 
who had to trade their labour via the market. Meanwhile, a small market elite could potentially 
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exploit these people’s productive efforts for their own betterment, thereby ultimately causing their 
own economy to stagnate or decline.cxxvii  
 However, some marked differences do catch the eye, most importantly that the ‘elite’ in this 
case was only an economic elite. At the start of the downturn of Nieuwkerke’s output around 1550, 
the wardens of the cloth industry were not in cahoots with the wealthy drapers who sought out 
private trading opportunities in Antwerp and Bergen op Zoom; in fact, they openly opposed the 
‘market elitism’ of these drapers. Also, and partly as a consequence of this, one cannot hold the 
actions of this small group of drapers responsible for the ‘institutional sclerosis’ that would underlie 
eventual stagnation because it blocked the formation of new, more efficient institutions. Strictly 
speaking, if we apply van Bavel’s theory to Nieuwkerke’s textile industry and trade, the ‘market 
elite’ would actually consist of people within the industry who attempted to maintain the corporate 
collective. After all, they were the ones who tried to inhibit market conditions from running their 
natural course, instead applying extra-economic pressure to safeguard a preexisting institution. The 
small group of rich entrepreneurs who sought out individual betterment cannot be held wholly 
responsible for the economic stagnation, although their actions did add to the breaking down of 
communal sentiments and by extension the social cohesion needed for successful corporate 
collective action. Rather, it would be more correct to say that after 1550, Nieuwkerke fell victim to 
a deadly cocktail of rising social inequality, growing religious antagonism, and the breaking up of 
corporate collective action in the cloth industry. These elements were all interrelated, forming a 
vicious triangle that would have engendered stagnation to the cloth trade in any case, but wherein 
military pressure and depopulation acted as a final catalyst. 
 
Conclusion 
Economic historians of pre-industrial Europe focus on the influence of institutional frameworks on 
the long-term economic and political development of societies. This article has attempted to show 
that institutionalized collective action was a paramount factor in the industrial development of the 
rural cloth centre Nieuwkerke in the late medieval county of Flanders. By combining the framework 
of Bas van Bavel’s latest book The Invisible Hand? and Tine De Moor’s conception of ‘corporate 
collective action’, the economic trajectory of this rural industrial centre can be subdivided into three 
phases of development. In doing so, corporate collective action emerges as a key variable to 
economic success, because the boom period of 1500-1550 coincided with the establishment and 
operation of a strong institutional framework of collective action. Meanwhile, this golden age was 
‘book-ended’ by phases during which a demonstrable lack of cohesion within the industry was 
accompanied either by a lack of noteworthy expansion (1300-1500) or declining production outputs 
(>1550). The institutional foundations for the expansion were laid during phase one, first by   the 
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acquisition of a cloth charter in 1358, which provided the legal base for the emergence of a 
corporation. Prompted by internal conflicts within the ranks of the drapery, the second half of the 
fifteenth century saw the establishment of regulations that created exclusivity (through the ‘draper’s 
marks’), self-governance and autonomy (principally through the public inquests or waerheden, and 
the authority of the industrial officers)—other criteria De Moor deems necessary for corporate 
collective action. Yet, in the case of Nieuwkerke, the protection by a powerful village lord against 
extra-economic pressure from the city of Ypres was another decisive element in securing that these 
favourable preconditions could come to fruition. It seems the villagers of Nieuwkerke had an active 
hand in attracting such a powerful protector in 1503—although the exact circumstances remain 
clouded in uncertainty. Also, the village’s true industrial boom occurred only when the textile 
corporation adopted a collective approach towards the commercial aspect as well, by renting cloth 
halls in the market cities for the benefit of all the village’s drapers: a strategy also employed by 
other successful cloth centres in this period. Tellingly, around the middle of the sixteenth century, 
when decline gradually set in, at the same time there were traces of individual entrepreneurs 
breaking the collective. Presumably, it was not so much these actions as their impact upon cohesion 
within the corporation which precipitated the industry’s declining output. Ultimately, the 
Iconoclastic Fury of 1566, and the bellicose turmoil that proceeded from it, defeated Nieuwkerke’s 
woollen drapery by causing emigration and closing off its main market outlet.  
 If the case of Nieuwkerke illustrates the economic advantage of corporate collective action 
in the pre-industrial period, it also highlights the interconnection between social equality and the 
successful operation of such collectives. Van Bavel emphasizes that the end of the development of 
market economies is characterized by their growing inequality and the emergence of a ‘market elite’ 
that seeks to maintain the then current institutional framework to ensure its own position. Indeed, 
when we look at individual production outputs of 1564-65 (Table 1), Nieuwkerke’s entrepreneurs 
clearly produced on very different scales. However, the question remains whether inequality was 
actually increasing, as van Bavel would suggest, or whether it remained more or less stable—which 
is to say, manifestly unequal, but no more so than it had been before—yet with an all-round loss of 
prosperity, as other historic cases have borne out. The hypothesis emerging from this study is that 
the veracity of growing inequality is subordinated to the perception of that increase in unequal 
opportunity. It was this perceived inequality that was deemed so disruptive to the Common Good in 
Nieuwkerke, both in the 1450s and the 1550s, producing an internal polarization that was 
detrimental to corporate collective action. Likewise, the social tensions of the mid-sixteenth century 
fed into the rising religious polarization that would become the undoing of Nieuwkerke’s textile 
economy. In that sense, the Dutch Revolt should in part be considered an endogenous component of 
the village’s economic collapse in the second half of the sixteenth century.   
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Figure 1. Textile centres in the Flemish West-Quarter, c. 1350-1600 
Source: Iason Jongepier, GIStorical Antwerp II (University of Antwerp/Hercules Foundation). 
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Source: ARB, Chamber of Accounts, Acquits en portefeuilles, No. 1367, unnumbered, disassembled booklet. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Cloth output in Nieuwkerke, late-fifteenth and sixteenth century 
Source: ARB, Chamber of Accounts, No. 44562. 
 
Table 1. Stratification of drapers in Nieuwkerke, based on production output (1564-65) 
Pieces of cloth No. of drapers Percent of drapers Percent of total production 
<=5 100 28.90 2.72 
>5<=25 98 28.32 14.20 
>25<=50 84 24.28 32.31 
>50<=100 53 15.32 36.59 
>100 11 3.18 14.19 
Total 346 100 100 
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